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Abstract
Deregulation and the relationship between bank CEO compensation and
risk-taking
The deregulation of the banking industry during the 1990s provides a natural (public
policy) experiment for investigating how firms adjust their executive compensation
contracts as the environment in which they operate becomes relatively more competitive.
Using the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 as a focal point, we investigate how banks changed
the equity-based component of bank CEO compensation contracts.  We also examine the
relationships between equity-based compensation and risk, capital structure, and
investment opportunity set.  Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that after
deregulation, the equity-based component of bank CEO compensation increases
significantly on average for the industry.  Additionally, we find that more risky banks
have significantly higher levels of equity-based compensation, as do banks with more
investment opportunities.  But, more levered banks do not have higher levels of equity-
based CEO compensation. Finally, we observe that most of these relationships become
more powerful in our post-deregulation period.3
1. Introduction
As Kole and Lehn (1999) point out, our understanding of the dynamics of
corporate governance structures is very limited.  We do not know very much about how
the governance structures of firms change in response to systemic changes in their
operating environments.
1  The ability of a firm to adjust to changes in its environment is
critical to its survival.  However, it is common for researchers to presume that the firms
that survive in competitive markets simply possess optimal governance structures and not
consider how those structures came into existence (Kole and Lehn, 1999).  As a firm’s
operating environment changes, especially if the new environment is more competitive,
the firm either adapts its governance structures accordingly, or the firm exits the market.
This is the essence of competition.  As firms fight for profits, the competitive
paradigm makes some very clear predictions about outcomes.  That is, strong performers
will pass the market test and therefore survive, while weak performers should shrink,
exit, or sell out.  This transfer of market share from underperformers to more successful
firms is a critical part of the process.  However, as Stiroh and Strahan (2003) point out,
this stylized picture is not always the reality.  Regulations and other barriers to entry can,
and often do, protect inefficient firms, limit entry and exit, and overall prevent the natural
consequences of the competitive process.
                                                          
1 Bliss and Rosen (2001) are among the first to examine how changes in firm’s operating environment
could have an impact on the structure of CEO compensation.  They examine the relationship between
mergers and CEO compensation during 1986-1995, a period marked by frequent mergers and systemic
changes in banks operating environment.  They find that size--no matter how acquired--adds to CEO
compensation both in cash and equity forms of compensation.  In addition, they find that banks where
CEOs receive more equity-based compensation (restricted shares and option grants) are less likely to
acquire other banks. The implication is that equity-based compensation tends to provide incentive for bank
CEOs to engage in activities that are value-enhancing.4
Until the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, restrictions on interstate banking were still
fairly common in the U.S.  These restrictions served to shield some banks from outside
competition and thus created many small distinct banking markets (Stiroh and Strahan,
2003).
However, the deregulation associated with the Riegle-Neal Act served to increase
the trend of interstate acquisitions and statewide branch banking.  This created a more
competitive environment by allowing banks to enter new markets and challenge
incumbent banks.  Stiroh and Strahan (2003) document that this type of deregulation of
banking markets allowed high performing banks to increase their market share at a much
faster pace after the deregulation.  Thus, these competitive reallocation effects will
transfer assets to better performers after deregulation.
In this paper, we use the deregulation of the U.S. banking industry as a reference
point to examine changes in the incentive contracts of bank CEOs.  We consider
deregulation to be an exogenous shock that changes the fundamental relationships that
prescribe the optimal executive compensation contract.  Thus, we consider the
deregulation of the banking industry during the 1990s to provide a natural experiment for
investigating the dynamics of corporate governance structures (Becher, Campbell, and
Frye, forthcoming).
Like Macey and O’Hara (2003), we focus on executive compensation and banks
for two reasons.  First, banks play a major monitoring role themselves that supposedly
helps mitigate the agency problems optimal executive compensation contracts are
developed to resolve.  And, second, because of the special liquidity production function
banks perform and the provision of fixed-rate deposit insurance by bank regulators, banks5
may face a more complex set of agency problems than other firms (John, Saunders, and
Senbet, 2000).  Thus, a better understanding of executive compensation in banking may
provide deep and insightful inferences about optimal executive compensation contracts in
many other industries, or organizational settings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides some
background on executive compensation.  Section 3 presents our set of hypotheses and
discusses the theoretical (and empirical) executive compensation literature that informs
our hypotheses.  Section 4 describes the data and methodology.  Our empirical results are
reported in section 5.  And, section 6 summarizes the findings and offers conclusions.
2. Background
Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation has recently come under increased
public and congressional scrutiny.  The use of equity-based compensation (i.e., stock
options and restricted stock) to motivate executives has been a major focus of this debate.
The resulting concerns have led to demands for greater transparency in executive stock
option programs and, possibly, to elimination of the programs altogether. Those calling
for the elimination of stock options claim that they are a poor way to measure an
executive’s contribution to firm performance.  This claim, however, is inconsistent with
the empirical research literature on executive compensation. Murphy (1985) and Jensen
and Murphy (1990) find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the
level of pay and performance.
2 In this article, we examine the relationship between the
                                                          
2 While they find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the pay of top-level executives
and firm performance, Jensen and Murply (1990) indicate that the sensitivity of pay per dollar change in
shareholder wealth is small for an occupation in which incentive pay is expected to play an important role.
The pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs varies by size of the firm.  For CEOs in firms in the top half of
their sample (ranked by market value), the pay-performance sensitivity is $1.85 per $1,000 change in
shareholder wealth, while for CEOs in firms in the bottom half of their sample, the pay-performance
sensitivity is $8.05 per $1,000.6
structure of CEO compensation and banking organizations’ financial characteristics from
1992 to 2000.  Over this nine-year period, a number of regulatory changes have afforded
banking organizations a greater degree of managerial discretion and incentive to use
equity-based compensation.
3 Deregulation increases the CEO’s investment opportunity
set and could make it difficult for shareholders to evaluate the executive’s actions, thus
exaggerating the information asymmetry problems between executives and shareholders.
In such an atmosphere of greater degree of managerial discretion, there is no assurance
that the self-interested behavior of CEOs will conform to that expected by shareholders.
Equity-based compensation contracts that give the executive a share in the
outcome of his actions could encourage executives to expend efforts to take actions that
are expected by shareholders (Prendergast, 2002). To some extent the incentive to use
equity-based compensation contracts increased in the 1990s with the relaxation of state
and federal restrictions on banks’ activities. For example, the Reigle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 allows banks to branch interstate by
consolidating existing out-of-state bank subsidiaries or by acquiring banks or individual
branches through mergers and acquisitions.
4 Brook, Hendershott, and Lee (1998) claim
that a more active takeover market can help solve the agency problems inherent in the
separation of ownership and control in publicly traded corporations because both explicit
and implicit takeover threats can motivate CEOs to take actions that maximize
                                                          
3 Smith and Watts (1992) argue that the degree of managerial discretion is inversely related to the degree of
regulation.
4 Prior to the Reigle-Neal Act, federal and state laws prevented banks from expanding across state lines
(with some exceptions). One exception was that a banking organizations could conduct interstate banking
operations through “nonbank banks”--those that do not meet the definition of a bank. Banks are commonly
defined as institutions that both accept demand deposits and make commercial loans.  The Reigle-Neal Act
allows bank holding companies to acquire banks in any state, effective September 29, 1995, and allows
mergers between banks located in different states beginning June 1, 1997. Unless states individually opt out
of this branching authority or choose to adopt an earlier starting date.7
shareholder value.  On the other hand Stein (1988) shows that the combination of
information asymmetries between CEOs and investors and takeover threats could make a
CEO’s optimal investment strategy myopic, causing him to take actions that may not
conform to that expected by shareholders.
Brook, Hendershott, and Lee (1998) find large positive abnormal returns for
banking organizations around the adoption of the Reigle-Neal Act.  They estimate that
these abnormal returns equate to about an $85 billion increase in the market value of
equity for the banking industry.  This result is consistent with the notion that a more
active takeover market made possible by the Reigle-Neal Act is perceived by
shareholders as providing net benefits because it encourages CEOs to maximize
shareholder value.
Beginning in 1987, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System began
to permit banking organizations to form separately capitalized security subsidiaries to
underwrite corporate debt and equity securities under the Section 20 provisions of the
Banking Act of 1933 (i.e., the Glass-Steagall Act).  However, these subsidiaries’ revenue
could not amount to more than 5 percent (increased later to 10 percent and then 25
percent) of the total revenue generated by the banking organization. The Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), extends this authority
and allows banks, securities firms, and insurance companies to be owned by the same
holding company. Product deregulation expands the investment opportunities for banking
organizations. Concerns about the relationship between risk and performance produced
Glass-Steagall. If these concerns are valid when commercial banking organizations have
both banking and underwriting subsidiaries, we expect to see changes in performance and8
compensation that is tied to this performance.  For example, Cornett, Ors, and Tehranian
(2002) find that the accounting- and market-based performance of banking organizations
that established Section 20 subsidiaries increased significantly more than banking
organizations that did not have Section 20 subsidiaries. Thus, it appears that the initial
alliances between commercial banking and investment banking have resulted in
significant positive performance changes, and these changes could alter the optimal
structure of CEO pay.
5
Despite the extensive research devoted to chief executive officers’ pay and
performance, there are only a few studies addressing these issues in the banking industry.
Banking is an industry in which regulation plays a major role, so moves to relax these
regulations may have a significant impact on the relationship between CEO pay and
performance.  For example, Crawford, Ezzell, and Miles (1995) and Hubbard and Palia
(1995) find that bank CEOs’ pay-performance sensitivity has increased significantly due
to deregulation in the banking industry.  Furthermore, Houston and James (1995)
compare bank CEOs pay-performance with non-bank CEOs’ pay-performance.  They
find that bank CEOs have lower pay-performance sensitivity than non-bank CEOs.  Barro
and Barro (1990) find that bank CEOs’ pay-performance sensitivity diminishes with
CEOs experience.  All of these studies, however, use data from periods well before the
deregulatory events considered in this study.
This study adds to the growing literature on bank CEO compensation by
                                                          
5 Fields and Fraser (1999) provides evidence whether banking organizations that have Section 20
subsidiaries have pay-performance compensation schemes that are like those used by investment banks.
They find that pay-performance sensitivities for those banks once they begin securities underwriting are
very similar to the sensitivities of non-Section 20 organizations.9
investigating the impact of banking deregulation on executive incentive compensation
contracts.  In particular, we ask three questions: First, does equity-based compensation as
a fraction of total compensation increase in the post-Reigle-Neal deregulatory
environment? Second, does equity-based compensation as a fraction of total
compensation increase or decrease with risk, leverage, and growth opportunities? And,
third, does equity-based compensation as a fraction of total CEO compensation increase
for banking organizations with Section 20 subsidiaries?
3. Testable hypotheses
The theoretical literature suggests that the structure of CEO compensation should
be a function of the firm risk, leverage, size, and growth opportunities (John and John,
1993; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; John, Saunders, and Senbet, 2000; Hermalin and
Wallace, 2001; Prendergast, 2002).  It is well known that because shareholders hold
residual claims on earnings, their interests will often diverge from those of creditors of
the firm.  Shareholders will have incentives to purchase some projects with negative net
present values if the increase in the shareholders' option value from accepting these
projects is sufficient enlarged.  This is because shareholders keep all the gains if the
investments are winners, and they share the losses with creditors if the investments are
losers.  Because of this option-like payoff for shareholders, especially of highly levered
firms, a CEO compensation structure that is relatively more equity-based may better
serve to align the interest of the CEO with that of the firm’s shareholders.
While shareholders have incentives to increase risk and leverage, there are
offsetting costs that weigh against these incentives. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest
that CEOs receive private benefits from control of the firm.  Because a CEO has an10
undiversifiable stake in the firm that employs her human capital, she has an incentive to
reduce risk in order to protect this stake (Jin, 2002).  In addition, the firm’s creditors
(depositors) will require compensation for bearing increased risk and higher leverage in
the form of a higher return on their funds, or restrict the amount of their investment, or
both.  Thus, the willingness of CEOs to invest in negative net present value (NPV)
projects is held in check by their desire to protect their undiversified stake in the firm and
the concern of creditors for the safety of their funds. This suggests that a CEO
compensation structure that is relatively less equity-based can serve as a commitment
device to hold in check the willingness of CEO to invest in negative NPV projects (John
and Qian, 2003).  This suggests that the creditors of firms with relatively low capital
levels will tend to prefer CEO compensation structures that are relatively less equity-
based.
However, if the creditors operate under the protection of a federal deposit
insurance system, then one element of this restraint will be negated.  Since depositors'
funds are insured, depositors do not have any incentive to impose discipline on the use of
their funds.  The deposit insurer, as the guarantor of deposits, serves the role of creditor
to the banking organization.  So long as a greater premium is not charged for bearing risk,
or covenants are not imposed to prevent excessive risk-taking, banking organizations will
use deposits to engage in riskier activities than would otherwise be possible.  Merton
(1977) develops a framework for analyzing the cost of deposit insurance and evaluating
the deposit insurer's liability.  Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981) indicates that providing
deposit insurance at less than its market value provides federally insured depository
institutions with a subsidy.  The subsidy is equal to the difference between the cost of11
deposits in the absence of deposit insurance and the cost of insured deposits including the
deposit insurance assessment.
Many researchers, including Merton (1978), Kane (1985), and Brickley and
James (1986), have indicated that a federally insured depository institution has, in
addition to the tangible assets on the balance sheet, a valuable "intangible" asset in the
form of access to underpriced, fixed-premium deposit insurance.  The capitalized value of
the subsidy is imbedded in the firm's common stock price.  As long as the premium
charged for insurance is less than the amount needed to compensate the deposit insurer
for the exposure to risk, then expansion into riskier activities may enhance a banking
organization common stock returns because risk-taking is subsidized.  This behavior is
referred to as the Moral Hazard hypothesis in Houston and James (1995) and the FDIC
hypothesis in Crawford, Ezzell, and Miles (1995). The Moral Hazard/FDIC hypothesis
predicts that CEOs of banking organizations with higher risk will receive a higher
proportion of their overall compensation in the form of equity-based pay.  This is because
increased risk increases the value of the executive’s equity position.  On the other hand,
this hypothesis predicts that executives of banking organizations with low risk will have a
higher proportion of overall compensation in the form of cash-based pay. This is because
such executives are like fixed-claimants.  Thus, increased risk will increase their
exposure to financial distress without an offsetting increase in expected benefits.
The effect of geographic and product deregulation on bank CEO’s compensation
structure depends on which activities are permitted, which activities banking
organizations invest in, how these activities mix with other assets, and how the activities
are managed.  Allowing banking organizations to expand geographically and into12
investment banking activities expands the efficient risk/return frontier available to firms.
The expanded efficient risk/return frontier provides banking organizations’ CEOs with
more growth opportunities.  Smith and Watts (1992) suggest that a CEO’s actions are less
readily observable if the firm has more growth opportunities. It is probably reasonable to
assume that a firm’s CEO knows more than shareholders and outside board members
about the firm’s projects and prospects.  The greater is the investment opportunities that
are available to CEOs the more difficult it will be to observe their investment choices.  In
such an atmosphere of asymmetry, there is no assurance that the self-interest behavior of
the CEO will conform to that expected by shareholders. To align the interest of the CEO
with that of shareholders, the firm could tie managerial compensation to the effect of the
CEO’s action on firm value. Equity-based compensation contracts giving CEOs a share
of the outcome of their actions encourage them to explore newer investment opportunities
to increase the possibility of large payoffs (Prendergast, 2002).  The conjecture that
greater growth opportunities are correlated with relatively more equity-based
compensation is referred to as the contracting hypothesis by Smith and Watts (1992).
The above arguments give rise to the following five hypotheses:
H1: Equity-based compensation as a fraction of total compensation (EBC)
increases with performance. This hypothesis tests the contracting
hypothesis of Smith and Watts (1992).  Empirical studies relate
compensation to performance because of the incentive effects of pay on
managerial actions (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; and Mehran, 1995).13
H2: EBC increases (or decreases) with financial leverage.  This provides a test
of the Moral Hazard hypothesis.  Increases in financial leverage can lead to
lower EBC because it may prevent managers from taking poor projects.
H3: EBC increases (decreases) with risk.  Like H2, this provides a test of the
Moral Hazard Hypothesis.  Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) suggest that EBC
for a risk-averse manager should be inversely correlated with firm risk.
H4: EBC is higher in the post-deregulation environment.
H5: EBC is higher for banking organizations with relatively more
activities/revenue from Section 20 subsidiaries.
In the next two sections, we develop a methodology and test these hypotheses.
4.  Methodology and data
A. Methodology
To develop a test of the above hypotheses regarding the impact of banking firm’s
financial characteristics on EBC, we specify the following regression model, similar to
Houston and James (1995):
+ + + + = − − − 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 , t j t j t j t j RISK LEVERAGE E PERFORMANC EBC α α α α
t j t j SIZE , 1 , 4 ε α + −      (1)
where PERFORMANCE j,t-1 is a measure of a banking organization’s market- or
accounting-based performance and is captured by two variables: the market value of
equity divided by the book value of equity and net income divided by total assets;
LEVERAGEj,t-1 is a measure of a banking organization’s leverage and is captured by two
variables: one minus the book value of equity divided by the book value of total assets
and total deposits divided by total assets; RISKj,t-1 is the variance of daily stock return14
within a year; SIZEj,t-1 is the value of total assets divided by 1000; and εj,t is an error
term.
6
In the above specification a positive α1 implies that EBC increases with growth
opportunities; a positive α2 that EBC increases with financial leverage; a positive
(negative) α3 that EBC increases (decreases) with risk; and a positive α4 that EBC
increases with the size of the banking firm.
Risk Hypothesis
Regulation in banking has traditionally focused on controlling risk-taking by
imposing minimum capital requirements and by limiting banks’ asset and liability
choices.  However, the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) expanded regulatory
oversight and included the compensation policies toward senior management.  Houston
and James (1995) suggest that FDICIA was in response to a direct recognition by
regulators that compensation contracts in banking be structured to provide CEOs with
excessive risk-taking incentives to exploit the provision of fixed-rate deposit insurance.
And John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) develop a model in which executive
compensation contracts serve to mitigate the moral hazard problem inherent in bank
regulation.  Implicitly, they suggest that optimal bank executive compensation contracts
may be a substitute for regulation.
Nonetheless, the sign of the relationship between risk and incentive compensation
as yet is still hotly debated in the literature.  For example, in most agency models, such as
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), the outcome is a negative relationship between risk and
                                                          
6 Most previous work on executive compensation has generally used one of two functional forms to
estimate the relationship between compensation and firm size (Murphy, 1998, has a discussion of the
different approaches). The first approach is to regress the dollar value of compensation on the dollar value15
incentive compensation.  However, Prendergast (2002) argues that risk (or uncertainty)
has another impact on incentive compensation that may lead to a positive correlation
between incentive compensation and risk.  Prendergast (2002) suggests that uncertain
environments result in relatively more delegation of responsibilities, and that this
delegation of responsibilities in turn generates an environment in which incentive
compensation is based relatively more on outputs.  Thus, uncertainty and incentive pay
are positively related.
In the only other empirical study of incentive based bank CEO compensation that
includes a control variable for risk, Houston and James (1995) report no significant
relationship between risk and incentive compensation.  However, their data is from the
1980s.  And, the banking industry today is far different from that of the 1980s.
Based on the conflicting theoretical evidence, we have no priors about the sign of
our risk measure.
The Deregulation Hypothesis
To investigate the impact of deregulation on EBC, our specification includes an
indicator variable DEREG as a variable measuring the period after the passage of Reigle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act in 1994. The coefficient on
DEREG summarizes the impact of deregulation on EBC, allowing us to investigate
whether geographical deregulation provided incentives for banking organizations to use
relatively more equity-based compensation. To measure the effect on EBC of allowing
banking organizations to expand into investment banking activities, our specification also
includes a variable to capture the activities of Section 20 subsidiaries.  Since, Section 20
                                                                                                                                                                            
of firm size. The second approach is to regress the log of compensation on the log of size.  Murphy says
that there is no theoretical reason to prefer one approach to the other.16
subsidiaries generate noninterest revenue we capture this activity isolating traditional
noninterest revenue and nontraditional noninterest revenue. Traditional noninterest
revenue is income from fiduciary activities plus service charges on deposit accounts.
Nontraditional sources of noninterest revenue are all other noninterest revenue (e.g.,
income from Section 20 activity).
Permitting banking organizations to engage in investment banking activities using
Section 20 subsidiaries expands their efficient risk/return frontier. The expanded efficient
risk/return frontier provides banking organizations’ CEOs with more growth
opportunities.  Thus, one may interpret the coefficient on nontraditional noninterest
revenue as capturing how past Section 20 activities are reflected in CEO compensation
structure.
To account for each of the above factors, an expanded model is used.  We write
the expanded model as an equation (2):
+ + + + + = − − − − 1 , 4 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 , t j t j t j t j t j SIZE RISK LEVERAGE E PERFORMANC EBC α α α α α
t j t t j t j DEREG TRADNOINT NT NONTRADNOI , 7 1 , 6 , 5 ε α α α + + + −      (2)
NONTRADNOINTj,t-1 is nontraditional sources of noninterest revenue (e.g., income from
Section 20 activity); TRADNOINTj,t-1 is traditional sources of noninterest revenue (e.g.,
fees from deposit services); and DEREGt is a Reigle-Neal binary variable that is equal to
one after 1996, zero otherwise.
The use of equity-based compensation increased during the sample period. To
incorporate this dynamic effect, we estimated pooled cross-sectional time series
regression equations.  Equation (2) is estimated with firm fixed-effects.17
B. Data
        The data used in this paper are for 100 banking organizations whose compensation
data was found in Standard & Poor's Compustat ExecuComp database.  These
compensation data are based on each banks’ publicly filed proxy statements.  The data
include measures of short-term compensation, such as base pay and annual bonus; and
measures of long-term compensation, such as long-term incentive plans, restricted stock,
and the value of options granted (using an approximation of the Black-Scholes option
pricing method).  Accounting data used in this study was obtained from bank holding
company (BHC) Y9 reports.  The Center for Research in Security Prices (CSRP) database
provides the stock market data.  Our sample contains 621 firm-year observations. Equity-
based compensation is measured as the value of option grants plus the value of restricted
stock grants divided by the sum of salary, bonus, the value of option grants, and the value
of restricted stock grants.
To obtain our measures of RISK, we use daily stock market data.  For each year in
the sample period, estimates of the variance of each banking organization’s equity returns
are made using data covering the twelve-month period ending with the last month of the
year.  Financial leverage (LEVERAGE) is estimated as one minus the ratio of book
market value of capital to total assets.  We also use the ratio of total deposits to total
assets as a measure of financial leverage because several of the components in the first
measure of leverage are included in the regulatory definition of total capital.
PERFORMANCE is captured by two measures: TOBINQ, computed as the ratio of
market to book value of the firm’s equity, and ROA, computed as the ratio of net income
to total assets.  SIZE is total assets divided by 1000. Thus, the coefficient α4 captures how18
a million dollars change in total assets influences EBC.7 TRADNOINT is income from
fiduciary activities plus fees from deposit services divided by total revenue.
NONTRADNOINT is all other noninterest income divided by total revenue.
Table 1 provides a list of banking organizations authorized by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to engage in securities underwriting, the year
such securities underwriting may be conducted through a Section 20 subsidiary, and the
average asset over the sample period.  The average size ranges between $4 and $337
billion over the 1992-2000 period.
CEOs are paid in many different ways.  For some CEOs, salary accounts for only
a small part of their compensation.  Managers may also receive performance-related
bonuses, restricted shares, and stock options.  We want to test the relationship between
managerial compensation, deregulation and Section 20 activity.  We also want to
distinguish between cash- and equity-based compensation, since the incentives for a
manager to increase firm value depend on whether pay is related to such value creation.
Following others such as Hubbard and Palia (1995), we break compensation into two
parts: cash-based (salary plus bonus) and equity-based (value of newly granted restricted
shares granted and stock options).
Table 2 shows that over the 1992-2000 period real average cash-based
compensation ranges between $1.2 to $2 billion (reported in 1982-84 dollars) for banking
organizations with Section 20 subsidiaries and between $580,000 and $708,000 for other
organizations. Cash-based compensation represents between 25% and 63% of total new
                                                          
7 We also included an asset growth variable in the empirical specifications.  In none of the regression
equations was this variable statistically significant.  Thus, we do not report those results.19
compensation for banking organizations with Section 20 subsidiaries and between 34%
and 66% for other organizations. Compensation varies widely across banking
organizations and time, which is not surprising since most of our banking organizations
grew significantly over the sample period.  Even after normalizing compensation for
asset size, there is still a wide variation.  For banking organizations with Section 20
subsidiaries, total compensation ranges from $0.0564 to $0.1366 per thousand dollars of
assets, while cash compensation ranges from $0.0353 to $0.0434 per thousand dollars of
assets. For other banking organizations, total compensation ranges from $0.1284 to
$0.2689 per thousand dollars of assets, while cash compensation ranges from $0.0848 to
$0.1094 per thousand dollars of assets.
Figure 1 presents additional information on how the compensation structure has
changed over the 1992 and 2000 sample period.  Equity-based compensation as percent
of direct compensation is reported for both banking organizations with Section 20
subsidiaries and those without Section 20 subsidiaries. Three findings are worth noting.
First, equity-based compensations as a percent of direct compensation (EBC) is
increasing over the years: in 1992, EBC was 30%; that percentage was about 53% by
2000.  Banking organizations with Section 20 subsidiaries tend to have on average higher
EBC than other firms.  In fact, over our sample period, average equity-based
compensation as a percent of direct compensation was 49% for Section 20 banking
organizations and 37% for non-Section 20 firms.  Third, in the period after 1994, it
appears that EBC at non-Section 20 firms is increasing at a slightly faster rate than that at
Section 20 banking organizations.  For example, EBC of Section 20 banking
organizations average 55.72 percent over the 1995-2000 period, about 15.15 percent20
more than over the 1992-1994 period; EBC of non-Section 20 banking organizations
average 41.97 percent over the 1995-200 period, about 17.02 more than over the 1992-
1994 period.  Thus, it appears that non-Section 20 firms are increasing the use of equity-
based compensation at a faster rate than Section 20 firms.
5.  Empirical results
We estimate equation (2) to examine the correlation between equity-based
compensation and characteristics of banking organizations.  Table 3 reports the summary
statistics for the variables used in our regression specifications.  Table 4 presents the
results of these pooled cross-sectional time series regression using annual data from 1992
to 2000.  Regression (1) of table 4 uses the market-to-book value ratio as the performance
measure and the ratio of total deposit to total asset as the leverage measure to examine the
correlates between equity-based compensation and the firm’s financial characteristics.
The results in column (1) are is consistent with the results of prior research.  Like
Houston and James (1995), we find that EBC is significantly and positively correlated to
the market-to-book value ratio. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that banking
organizations with greater investment opportunities are more likely to rely on equity-
based incentives.  We also find a negative but insignificant correlation between leverage
and EBC.  The positive coefficient on the risk variable (measured by the variance of stock
returns) suggests that equity-based incentives increase with the level of risk taking.  EBC
is positively but insignificantly correlated with a banking organization’s size.
Column (2) reports the results using return on assets as the performance measure.
This variable is positively correlated with EBC, but it is insignificant at the conventional
levels.  Column (3) reports the results using the market-to-book value ratio as the21
performance measure, but one minus the ratio of book market value of capital to total
assets as the leverage measure.  Like the ratio of total deposits to total asset, this ratio is
negatively, but insignificantly correlated with EBC.  Column (4) replaces the market-to-
book value ratio in column (3) with the return on assets.  Again, this variable is not
significantly correlated with EBC.
Overall, the Reigle-Neal indicator variable is positive, consistent with the
increased use of equity-based incentives after the passage of Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act in 1994.  This is consistent with the findings of Kole and Lehn
(1999) who study the impact of deregulation on the airline industry.
The variable capturing Section 20 activity, nontraditional noninterest revenue
divided by total revenue, is positive and statistically significantly correlated with EBC,
suggesting that CEOs of banking organizations with higher than average nontraditional
noninterest revenue (e.g., from activities of Section 20 subsidiaries), on average, have
significantly more equity-based compensation.  Cornett, Ors, and Tehranian (2002) find
that a banking organization’s performance following the establishment of Section 20
subsidiaries improved relative to a control group of banking organizations that did not
establish Section 20 subsidiaries.  As indicated in figure 2, banking organization with
Section 20 subsidiaries tend to have relatively more revenue from nontraditional
noninterest sources.  Since Section 20 activities generate nontraditional noninterest
revenue, our results are consistent with the conjecture that CEOs of Section 20 banking
organizations captured some of these gains in the form of higher equity-based
compensation relative to CEOs of non-Section 20 firms.22
6. Conclusion
One of the fundamental components of corporate governance is a well-designed
CEO compensation package.  However, very little attention has been paid to how
executive compensation structures adjust to major public policy induced changes in firms
operating environments.
This paper examines CEO equity-based compensation in the banking industry
using 1992-2000 data.  This time period captures perhaps the most significant
deregulation that has ever occurred in the banking industry (Calomiris, 2000).
Additionally, the use of equity-based compensation (i.e., stock options and restricted
shares) to motivate executives has recently come under increased public and
congressional scrutiny.  The resulting concerns have led to demands for greater
transparency in executive stock option programs and, possibly, to elimination of the
programs altogether because they are claimed to be a poor way to measure an executive’s
contribution to firm performance.  Over the nine-year period that we examine a number
of regulatory changes have afforded banking organizations a greater degree of managerial
discretion and incentive to use equity-based compensation. Deregulation increases the
CEO’s investment opportunity set and could make it difficult for shareholders to evaluate
the executive’s actions, thus exaggerating the information asymmetry problems between
executives and shareholders. In such an atmosphere of greater degree of managerial
discretion, there is no assurance that the self-interested behavior of CEOs will conform to
that expected by shareholders (Prendergast, 2000).  In addition, beginning in 1987, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System began to permit banking
organizations to form separately capitalized security subsidiaries to underwrite corporate23
debt and equity securities under the Section 20 provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act.  This
deregulation expands the investment opportunities for banking organizations. In this
paper, we document a positive correlation between the nontraditional noninterest sources
of revenue, including revenue from Section 20 activity, and the use of equity-based
compensation. This positive association is consistent with Smith and Watts (1992)
conjecture that greater investment opportunities are correlated with relatively more
equity-based compensation to align the interest of CEOs and shareholders.  We also
document a higher percentage of equity-based compensation in the period after the
passage of the Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.
Thus, banking organizations appear to respond to geographical deregulation by providing
relatively more equity-based incentives to better align CEOs’ incentives with those of
shareholders.  This is consistent with the theoretical argument of Prendergast (2002) and
the empirical findings of Kole and Lehn (1999).
Further research will investigate how the fundamental relationships between
equity-based compensation and risk, leverage, and investment opportunities changed
after deregulation.24
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Figure 1
























The distribution of noninterest revenue by year
Traditional noninterest revenue is income from fiduciary activities plus service charges on deposit
accounts. Nontraditional noninterest revenue is all other noninterest revenue.
A. Nontraditional noninterest revenue








































Bank holding companies with Section 20 subsidiaries
Initial Average  total
Order  assets (billion of dollars)
Bankers Trust New York Corporation 4/87 108
Citicorp 4/87 254
J.P. Morgan & Company 4/87 198
Chase Manhattan Corporation 5/87   438
Chemical New York Corporation 5/87   161
PNC Financial Corporation 7/87   71
First Interstate Bancorp 10/87   53
Bank of Boston Corporation 8/88   53
First Chicago Corporation 8/88   56
Fleet/Norstar Financial Group 10/88   97
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated 11/88   24
Barnett Banks, Inc. 1/89   40
NationsBank Corporation 5/89 159
Southtrust Corporation 7/89   62
First Union Corporation 7/89 149
Norwest 12/89 121
Banc One Corporation 7/90 149
Dauphin Deposit Corporation 6/91     5
Synovus Financial Corporation 9/91   10
BankAmerica Corporation 3/92 229
National City Corporation   2/94   70
SunTrust Banks Inc. 8/94   62
First of America Bank Corporation 10/94   23
Mellon Financial Corporation 4/95   47
Bank of New York Co Inc. 6/96   69
KeyCorp  2/96    81
Corestates Financial Corporation 8/97    33












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Correlates between CEO’s equity-based compensation and firm financial characteristics
This table reports the regression results of correlating EBC and banking organization’s financial
characteristics using the following equation:
+ + + + + = − − − − 1 , 4 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 , t j t j t j t j t j SIZE RISK LEVERAGE E PERFORMANC EBC α α α α α
t j t t j t j DEREG TRADNOINT NT NONTRADNOI , 7 1 , 6 , 5 ε α α α + + + −
The dependent variable is the percentage of EBC for CEOs. The percentage of equity-based compensation
(EBC) is total equity-based compensation divided by total compensation.  PERFORMANCE j,t-1 is captured
by two variables: the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity and net income divided by
total assets. LEVERAGEj,t-1 is captured by two variables: one minus the book value of equity divided by
the book value of total assets and total deposits divided by total assets. RISKj,t-1 is the variance of daily
stock return within a year; SIZEj,t-1 is the value of total assets divided by 1000; NONTRADNOINTj,t-1 is
nontraditional sources of noninterest revenue (e.g., income from Section 20 activity); TRADNOINTj,t-1 is
traditional sources of noninterest revenue (e.g., fees from deposit services); DEREGt is a Reigle-Neal
binary variable that is equal to one after 1996, zero otherwise; and ε j,t is an error term. Number of firm-year
observations is 621. Numbers in parentheses below the coefficient estimates are t-statistics. The t-statistics
are starred if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10 (*), 5(**), and 1
(***) percent level.
(1)  (2) (3) (4)
Performance measures




Net income-to-Total Assets  3.6737  3.6675
(1.48) (1.46)
Leverage measures
Deposit-to-Total Assets -0.2052 -0.2283
(-1.03) (-1.13)
(One minus Book capital  -1.2422 -0.3674
    divided by total assets) (-1.27) (-0.37)






Size  0.00002 0.00001 0.00003 0.00002
(0.43) (0.29) (0.75) (0.57)
Nontraditional noninterest
    revenue divided by  1.2515 1.2893 1.2831 1.3774






    revenue divided by -0.4271 -0.0855 -0.5976 -0.1505
    total revenue (-0.84) (-0.17) (-1.16) (-0.30)






R-square 0.5261 0.5149 0.5266 0.5138